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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appellee,

:

vs.

:

DENNIS RICHARD VIGH,

:

Appellant.

:

Case No. 930204-CA
Argument Priority
Classification No. 2

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 78-2a3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. All references herein are to
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, unless otherwise stated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the Court err in denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress?
This issue is reviewed under the clear error standard as to the
findings of fact and the correction of error standard as to the legal
conclusions. State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

2.

Was there sufficient evidence to support the enhancement element
under § 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix) that Defendant's actions took place

within 1,000 feet of a school? This issue is reviewed under the
standard of whether or not the evidence, and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the
Defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. State
v. Pedersen. 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied.
815 P.2d 241 (1991).
3.

Was there sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction of
possession of cocaine? This issue is reviewed under the standard
of whether or not the evidence, and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the Defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.

State v.

Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied. 815
P.2d 241 (1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following statute governs disposition of this appeal: Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8. A copy is set forth in the Appendix.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Dennis R. Vigh appeals from his conviction, following a jury
trial of the offenses of possession, within 1,000 feet of a school, of marijuana with intent
to distribute, see § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv), a second degree felony, one count of possession,
within 1,000 feet of a school, of cocaine, see § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), a second degree felony,
and unlawful possession of marijuana without tax stamps affixed, see § 59-19-106, a
third degree felony.
On August 26, 1992, Defendant filed a pleading entitled "Severance
Motion; Discovery Motion; Bill of Particulars; Motion in Limine; Suppression Motion;
Motion to Dismiss; Motion to be Given Adequate Time to File Motions; with included
Petition for Motions Hearing, and Order for Record Transcripts [sic]." Hearing on
Defendant's motions was held on October 27, 1992. The motions were denied by the
Court as announced from the Bench on October 27, 1992 and by a written "Order on
Defendant's Motion" [sic] entered November 12, 1992.
A jury trial was held on February 4, 1993, resulting in verdicts of guilty
as to all counts.
On March 9, 1993, Judge Rodney S. Page sentenced the Defendant to two
terms of one to fifteen (1-15) years in the Utah State Prison, to be served concurrently
with each other, and one term of zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison, to be
served consecutively to the second degree felonies.
The Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on April 6, 1993.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 16, 1992, Metro Narcotics Strike Force officers requested and
received a Search Warrant for the trailer home located at 442 South State, #66, Layton,
Utah. Tr. at 33.1 The Affidavit supporting the request was based upon information
received from a confidential informant as well as subsequent police attempts to verify
statements of the informant. Tr. at 32. Detective Gary Haws signed the Affidavit.
Hearing Tr. at 10. Detective Haws based his statement on information received from a
confidential informant. Hearing Tr. at 11. He had not previously used that informant,
nor had he previously known him or her. Hearing Tr. at 11-12. Detective Haws did not
check the informant's criminal history. Hearing Tr. at 11. The conversation took place
over the phone, not in person. Hearing Tr. at 24-25. The information in the Affidavit
was based solely on evidence given by the confidential informant. Hearing Tr. at 15.
Acting on the informant's allegations, Mr. Haws searched the home of Pam
Tucker and located cash and marijuana. Hearing Tr. at 16. He then attempted to verify
that the Defendant owned the trailer home in question and the car which was parked
there. Hearing Tr. at 19. He also requested the Defendant's criminal history. Hearing
Tr. at 18.
The results of the Tucker search and the related police activities were
incorporated into the Search Warrant Affidavit, which was presented to Judge K. Roger
1

In the interests of clarity and ease of reference, the transcript of the trial
shall hereafter be referred to as "Tr." and the transcript of the October 27, 1992 Hearing
will be referred to as "Hearing Tr."
4

Bean of the Layton Circuit Court. Tr. at 33. During the time in which the Warrant and
supporting documentation were being prepared and executed, a police officer maintained
surveillance on the trailer home. Tr. at 34. After the Warrant was issued, Defendant
was placed under arrest and the trailer home was searched. Tr. at 39. The Defendant
was also searched. Tr. at 36. Various items of drug paraphernalia, a quantity of
marijuana, cocaine residue and an amount of cash were discovered. Tr. at 36-60.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Trial Court improperly denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The
Search Warrant authorizing the search of Defendant's trailer home was based upon
information supplied by a confidential informant whose trustworthiness had not been
established. The issuing magistrate also improperly considered the Defendant's past
criminal history and the fruits of the search of a second person's home in his probable
cause determination. The Affidavit farther failed to establish a link between the place
to be searched and potential criminal activity. When the improper portions of the search
Warrant Affidavit are removed, the remaining information is not sufficiently specific
regarding a connection between the place to be searched and criminal activity, nor does
it contain sufficient evidence of the informant's trustworthiness to justify probable cause.
The magistrate erred in issuing the Warrant, and the trial court erred in affirming that
determination.
There is insufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that
Defendant's actions took place within 1,000 feet of a school. There is no direct, legal,
5

access between the school involved and Defendant's mobile home. A six foot chain-link
fence, Union Pacific railroad tracks, and a barbed wire fence separate the mobile home
from the school. The enhancement element of Defendant's conviction cannot stand.
There is also insufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that
Defendant possessed cocaine. The evidence produced by the State is sufficient to convict
Defendant only of possession of plastic bags which had formerly contained cocaine if
such were a crime. There was insufficient cocaine residue available to measure or
otherwise quantify. The relevant chemical analysis is so sensitive that its literal use
under present Utah law could result in the conviction of many otherwise innocent people.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
When reviewing probable cause determinations, Utah Appellate Courts
consider the underlying factual findings under a "clearly erroneous" standard and review
conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 643 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). On those occasions in which a trial court's probable cause determination is based
upon a written affidavit, the affidavit must be considered in its entirety, and the appellate
court "determines whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding
that there were enough facts in the affidavit to find that probable cause existed". Id.
(citations omitted).

An appellant is required to marshal the evidence in favor of the
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court's ruling, and then demonstrate why that ruling is incorrect. State v. Chavez. 840
P.2d 846, 848 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress on August 26, 1992, requesting that
evidence obtained from his trailer home be suppressed at trial. R. at 37-42. The trial
court held a hearing addressing the suppression Motion and other matters on October 27,
1992. Hearing Tr. at 4. The court denied the Motion. Id. at 36.2 At trial, Defendant
again raised his objection to the introduction of any evidence obtained as a result of
either of the Search Warrants. Tr. at 13-14. The court found the "objection is ongoing
and the fact that you have made the Motion and the court has denied it is preserved for
appeal purposes at any rate". Tr. at 14. The court further included in the ongoing
objection any evidence seized at the time of the arrest which would "contend the same
theory". Id. The issue has thus been properly preserved for appeal.

In the course of denying the Motion to Suppress, the court stated:
In looking at the Affidavit that was presented in this
particular case, particularly the information provided by
the confidential informant, when the reliability of that
informant was tested and determined, as was done by the
officer herein, the court would find in looking at the
Affidavit as a whole, there is a substantial basis from
which the magistrate could have concluded that there was
contraband or evidence of illegality in the trailer of the
Defendant and as it was described, that trailer was
significant particularly for those executing the warrant to
know where to look, and, therefore, the court will deny
the Motion to Suppress.
Tr. at 36.
7

Defendant's Motion to Suppress challenged the search of his trailer home
and the warrant which authorized that search. The evidence in support of that warrant
is found solely in the "Affidavit for Search Warrant" (reproduced in the Appendix) which
formed the basis of the issuing magistrate's decision. Hearing Tr. at 14-15. At first
blush, the evidence listed in the Affidavit appears to support the magistrate's decision.
Upon closer inspection, the Affidavit contains insufficient information upon which to base
a search warrant, despite consideration of those facts in a light most favorable to the
State.
The Affidavit first asserts that the Affiant received information from a
confidential informant that 1) Defendant sold marijuana and cocaine; 2) Defendant resided
at the Clearfield Trailer Park, No. 66; 3) the informant had seen marijuana in
Defendant's presence, in his automobile, and in his home; 4) the informant had witnessed
cocaine and paraphernalia in Defendant's home within the last ten days; 5) the Defendant
had been under the home of Pam Tucker, and the informant believed that he had left
something there; 6) that Defendant was storing large amounts of money at Tucker's
residence and that of his mother. Aff. at 2-3. The Affiant then declares that "based upon
Affiant's independent investigation, the information supplied by the informant is
accurate". Aff. at 4.
The independent investigation consisted of the Affiant's search of the
residence of Pam Tucker, during which he found marijuana in the crawl space below the
home. Id. at 3. The search also revealed approximately Twelve Thousand Dollars
8

($12,000.00) in cash. The Affiant further related a conversation between a dispatcher and
the Manager of the Clearfield Trailer Park, which confirmed that Dennis Vigh lived in
trailer # 66. A registration check revealed the Defendant's ownership of the 1989 Ford.
Id. Finally, the Affiant obtained a criminal history of the Defendant which indicated one
conviction in 1986 and an arrest in 1990. Affiant attached a copy of a Search Warrant
and supporting Affidavit which were prepared and executed several years prior to
Defendant's current arrest. Id.
This information is insufficient to establish probable cause for a search
warrant. Neither Defendant's past criminal history nor the accompanying Affidavits and
Search Warrant from a past incident can be considered in the probable cause
determination. The Utah Court of Appeals, addressing recent, similar circumstances,
stated:
[The Defendant's] criminal record also does
establish that he is currently dealing in
substances, particularly since his most recent
1988, at least two years prior to the events in
bar.

nothing to
controlled
arrest was
the case at

Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644. The Defendant in Brooks had previously been convicted of a
distribution offense, yet the court disallowed consideration of his record. Under Brooks
and similar authority, this Court must disallow consideration of Defendant's past conduct,
even at the probable cause level.
The "independent investigation" facts must also be disregarded since they
consist of mere form without substance. Verification of ownership of a 1989 Ford
9

Tempo lends nothing to the credibility of a confidential informant, inasmuch as any
citizen could determine the car which the Defendant drove. The same is true of the
location of the Defendant's home, which was readily available, as shown by the ease with
which officers verified his residence.
When these portions of the Affidavit are excised from consideration, the
remaining information in support of the Warrant consists solely of the untested statements
of a confidential informant and the fact that police officers found marijuana and cash in
a second person's home. The Affidavit contains no indication of veracity or reliability
regarding the confidential informant, and indeed contradicts itself in stating first, that the
confidential informant is a citizen informant who is not receiving remuneration, and then
affirmatively asserting that the informant is a known user of controlled substances. The
presence of controlled substances and cash in a home which Defendant neither owned nor
controlled lends no credibility to the confidential informant's bald assertions. Therefore,
the informant's information is unsupported and since "the sufficiency of an affidavit
supporting a search warrant depends on indicia of reliability sufficient to assure a neutral
magistrate of probable cause," State v. Romero, 674 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah 1981), the
search was illegal and the resulting evidence should have been suppressed at trial.
Finally, the informant's naked assertion that drugs would be found in the
Defendant's home is unsupported by any information whatsoever. "Given that a probable
cause determination centers on the probability that evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place ...". Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644 (emphasis supplied), an Affidavit must
10

establish a link to the place to be searched. Even when viewed in a light most favorable
to the trial court's decision, the Affidavit fails to establish such a link by making only
unsupported assertions that evidence would be found there and failing to bolster the
credibility of the confidential informant.
In short, the Affidavit supplies neither information linking the possibility
of criminal activity to the specific place to be searched, nor sufficient indicia of the
informant's reliability to justify a probable cause determination. The issuing magistrate
erred in granting the Warrant, and the trial court erred in affirming that determination.
POINT II
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
ENHANCEMENT ELEMENT THAT DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS
TOOK PLACE WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF A SCHOOL.
Pursuant to the provisions of 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix), the penalty for certain
controlled substance offenses which take place within 1,000 feet of a school is enhanced
by one degree. There is insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict that Defendant's
actions took place within 1,000 feet of a school.
In considering a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the Court of Appeals
must review the evidence and reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom in
a light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah
1989). A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime of
11

which he was convicted. State v. Pedersen. 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Applying this standard solely to the element of whether the conduct
complained of occurred within 1,000 feet of a school, the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt.
Under its police power, the legislature has taken measures to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare of the children of Utah from the presumed potential
danger created when drug transactions occur on or near a school ground. State v. Moore,
782 P.2d 497, 503 (Utah 1989). Defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of
the enhancement. Rather, his challenge goes only to the correct manner in which to
calculate the distance to the school. The "school" involved in this case is the Pioneer
Adult Rehabilitation Center, known as PARC, and referred to in the Transcript as
"park."
At trial, the only evidence regarding proximity to a school was elicited
from Detective Gary Haws and Detective Mark Arrington.
Detective Haws testified that he measured the distance between the
Defendant's mobile home and the school involved using two routes:
Q.

Would you show, first of all, using Exhibit 36, the
manner which you used in actually walking the
distance from the Defendant's residence to the
school property?

A.

On the first occasion, I left the trailer, went down
the street, down the other street of the trailer park.
I then exited out of the trailer park on to 350 here.
Went over through the hole in the fence, to the
12

railroad tracks, then I went down the railroad tracks
and then over to the property.
Q.

Did you determine what amount of distance you
traveled during that particular walking motion?

A.

On that occasion, I went approximately 983 feet.

Tr. at 63, 64.
Detective Haws added a second potential measurement:

A.

[I] went straight from the school, across to the
mobile home park, between the trailers, up the
street again, down the street, and to the trailer.

Q.

Was that a more direct route?

A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

What did you determine based upon your stepping
it off with the instrument on that occasion?

A.

That it was 722 feet.

Tr. at 64.
Detective Arrington offered no testimony regarding an exact distance
between Defendant's mobile home and the school. He did, however, offer the following:
[T]his blueprint [State's Exhibit No. 35] is a scale of 1 inch
equaling 400 feet. Now, what I did this morning was take
a compass to depict a thousand feet [sic] radius from the
center of the mobile home park itself and the line shows
that from the center, going out 1,000 feet from the center
of the mobile home park, it cuts through the middle of the
property of the rehabilitation school itself.
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Tr. at 124.
On cross-examination, Detective Haws conceded that the portion of the
mobile home park bordering the railroad tracks was fenced by a 6 foot chain-link fence.
Tr. at 66. He also testified that there was no access between the mobile home park and
the school, such as a sidewalk or overpass or street. Tr. at 66, 67. Detective Haws was
asked:
Q.

So in other words, in order to get from the mobile
home park to the Rehabilitation Center, you would
have to trespass on the Union Pacific right-of-way?

A.

You would have to cross the tracks.

Q.

Now, if you were to go in a, for example, in a
legal fashion, in a way or a manner in which you
did not have to trespass, what would be the most
direct route to get from the Clearfield Mobile Home
Park to get to the Rehabilitation Center?

A.

Probably up around the tracks.

* * *

Q.

... Do you suppose that from the no. 66 in the
mobile home park, do you suppose that that route
would be in excess of a thousand feet?

A.

I would suppose that to be true.

Q.

I would suppose so too. That's the only route, by
the way, to which the public would have access, I
believe, isn't it?

A.

There was [sic] holes in the fence to get over there.
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Q.

But the route in excess of a thousand feet, that
would be the easiest and most direct public route?

A.

Yes.

Tr. at 67, 68.
Detective Arrington was asked a similar question:
Q.

Now, if I left no. 66 and I wanted to walk to the
park [sic] and I did not want to trespass, is that in
excess of a thousand feet that I would have to
travel?

A.

In order to avoid crossing the railroad and so forth
to stay on the street, probably. You have to walk
northbound up to 200 South and then west and then
south again.

Tr. at 126.
He also testified that the nearest overpass between the school and the
mobile home park would be at 200 South. Tr. at 127.
Robert Daniels, the Executive Director of the Pioneer Adult Rehabilitation
Center (PARC) testified that the school property was entirely surrounded by fences. Tr.
at 100. He also added that there was a barbed wire fence on the boundary between the
railroad tracks and the school property. Tr. at 100.
The enhancement element has withstood constitutional scrutiny in both
State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1986) and State v. Stromberg. 783 P.2d 54 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). Neither case, however, specifically addressed the issue raised by
Defendant, namely: how the 1,000 feet is to be measured.

15

One stated purpose behind the enhancement for activity ocurring in
proximity to a school is to "[c]reate a drug-free environment around our school
children." Stromberg. 783 P.2d at 60. Another stated purpose is that the proscription
of sales within the environs of schools is a rational means of reducing the risk of easy
availability that can lead to acquisition by children. United States v. Agilar. 779 F.2d
123, 125 (2d Cir. 1985), cert, denied. 475 U.S. 1068 (1986); Moore. 782 P.2d at 503.
If these are the purposes underlying the enhancement, then these purposes
are met where the school is separated from the drugs by the following:
1.

Six foot chain link fence;

2.

Union Pacific railroad tracks and associated right-of-way;

3.

Barbed wire fence surrounding the school property itself;

4.

At least 722 feet and up to 983 feet in foot-traffic distance;
and,

5.

A legal, non-trespassory, travel distance in excess of 1,000
feet.

Defendant asks the Court to define the most direct non-trespassory route
available as the proper measurement for calculation of the enhancement.

Such

construction meets the legislative intent to protect school children, and provides guidance
to those who may still choose to engage in illegal activities.

16

POINT HI
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE.
In considering a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the Court of Appeals
must review the evidence and reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom in
a light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah
1989). A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted. State v. Pedersen. 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
For purposes of this appeal, Defendant does not challenge that the relevant
evidence was in his possession, only that there was insufficient cocaine to justify a
conviction.
The evidence regarding Defendant's possession of cocaine was offered by
James Gaskill, the director of the crime laboratory at Weber State University. He
testified as follows:
Q.

[M]r. Gaskill, in this exhibit, what has been marked as Plaintiffs
Exhibit No. 21, were you able to determine how much cocaine
was in that exhibit?

A.

No.

Q.

Is there a reason why you were not able to?

17

A.
*

It was just a very small amount and insufficient for any kind of
reasonable quantitation.
*

*

Q.

Would there have been enough, do you know, in this particular
exhibit for personal consumption?

A.

I don't know that there would have been enough for any kind of
reaction on the part of the individual who consumed it. Obviously
they could consume it, but it was very ~ a small quantity, what we
would call residue.

Q.

A nonmeasurable amount?

A.

Right.

Tr. at 192, 193. Similar testimony was offered on Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 45
and 46. Tr. at 192, 193, 199.
Utah cases provide that useability of a controlled substance is not required
for conviction. State v. Winters. 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872 (1964). As the Winters
court stated "[t]he determinative test is possession of a narcotic drug, and not useability
of a narcotic drug." 396 P.2d at 875.
In State v. Warner. 788 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Court of
Appeals noted that the Winters court had avoided determining whether there is some
minimum amount of controlled substance below which a conviction could not be
affirmed. 788 P.2d at 1041. Therefore, while it does not appear that useability of the
controlled substance is required, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have both
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indicated that there is some lesser amount which will prove insufficient to support a
conviction.
As established by the testimony of Mr. Gaskill, this is the case to establish
the lower threshold.
The amount of cocaine present on State's Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 45 and 46 was
a "nonmeasurable" amount. Tr. at 192, 193, 199. According to an article in the ABA
Journal, cocaine-soiled paper money is so prevalent that even Janet Reno, while the
Florida State Attorney, was in possession. Mark Curriden, Courts Reject Drug-Tainted
Evidence, ABA Journal, Aug. 1993, at 22. According to a forensic chemist, Dr. James
Woodford of Atlanta: f,[t]he probability that every single person in the United States is
carrying drug-tainted money is almost certain." Id. In 1987, a study by a Drug
Enforcement Administration scientist found that one-third of all money at the Federal
Reserve Building in Chicago was tainted with cocaine. Id. If the current Utah standard
is literally applied without further refinement, that one-third of all the people deplaning
at Salt Lake City from flights from Chicago, and carrying paper money, could be
charged and convicted of possession of cocaine.
Therefore, the time has come for the Court to set a standard to provide
guidance to trial courts, prosecutors and defense attorneys. If useability cannot be the
threshold, then the proper place to draw the line may be measurability. This would
allow the jury to have a quantifiable idea of the amount of substance involved, rather
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than an amorphous feeling that the substance exists in an infinitely small amount, but the
law, in its present state, requires a conviction.
Laws regulating possession of cocaine are designed to curb the societal ill
of drug use. The possession of amounts of cocaine in quantities incapable of being
measured cannot further its use and cannot, therefore, support a conviction. The time
and energy devoted to prosecution of cocaine residue cases is disproportionate to the
harm curtailed. The possession of cocaine residue in amounts which cannot be measured
presents no risk of future harm, and, therefore, need not be punished. Individuals who
possess cocaine residue may have already terminated their association with the drug trade
and, therefore, need not be punished. See, Seth Davidson, Note, Criminal Liability for
Possession of Nonusable Amounts of Controlled Substances, 11 Colum. L. Rev. 596,
596-597 (1977).
As the Arizona Supreme Court has stated:
As a matter of law the intent necessary to establish the
crime of possession is not present when the amount is so
minute as to be incapable of being applied to any use, even
though it might be identifiable as narcotics by chemical
analysis.
State v. Ballesteros. 413 P.2d 739, 741 (1966).
Defendant requests that the Court determine that the possession of cocaine
residue in amounts which are too small to be measured be deemed insufficient to support
a conviction for possession of cocaine.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant requests that the Court remand his case to the trial court with
instructions that his Motion to Suppress be granted.

Alternatively, the Defendant

requests that the Court reverse the enhancement element of his conviction of possession,
within 1,000 feet of a school, of marijuana with intent to distribute, thereby reducing it
to a third degree felony, vacate his conviction of possession, within 1,000 feet of a
school, of cocaine, and remand his case to the trial court for sentencing.
DATED this 3rd day of September, 1993.
KING & KING

By: X/ FKAy^ ^
GLtfN &! CELLA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
Janet C. Graham (#1231)
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
postage prepaid, this 3rd day of September, 1993.
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MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

In Re: Search of the mobile home:
located at 442 South State, #66,
Clearfield, a single wide trailer:
beige in color with dark brown
trim, occupied by Dennis Richard :
Vigh and the vehicle described
as a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
:
#217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453,
registered to Dennis Vigh.
:

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss.

AFFIDAVIT FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

Before Alfred C. VanWagenen, Circuit Court Judge, the
undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that there
is probable cause to believe that on the premises and vehicle
described as follows:
The mobile home located at 442 South State, #66,
Clearfield, Utah, a single wide trailer beige in
color with dark brown trim, occupied by Dennis
Richard Vigh; and a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
number 217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453, registered
to Dennis Richard Vigh.
there is now certain property or evidence described as:
Controlled substances including marijuana and cocaine
Items of drug paraphernalia
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled substances
Documents evidencing the ownership and occupancy of the
residence
Money

and that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired and is
being unlawfully possessed and is evidence of the crime of
possession of controlled substances.
The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are
as follows:
1. Affiant received information from a confidential
informant that Dennis Richard Vigh is engaged in the sale of
marijuana and cocaine.

The informant stated that Vigh resides in

Clearfield at the Clearfield Trailer Park, #66, located a few
blocks south of Crown Billiards. The informant stated that
marijuana was seen in the presence of Vigh personally by the
informant and the informant is knowledgeable about marijuana
because the informant has used it in the past.

The informant

also indicated that cocaine and paraphernalia had been seen by
the informant in Vigh's presence.

Both of the items had been

seen at Vigh's residence during the last 10 days.
2.

The informant stated that Vigh had been under the

home of Pam Tucker in Sunset and believed he may have stashed
something there. The informant further stated that the informant
believed that Vigh also kept a large amount of money at Tucker's
residence.
3.

The informant stated that during the last 10 days

the informant had also observed marijuana in Vigh's presence in
his vehicle.

The vehicle was described as a 1988 Ford Tempo,

two-door, creme in color, license number 217 EVE.
4.

The informant stated that Vigh was selling a large

amount of controlled substances sufficient to store house a large

amount of money which was kept at Tucker's residence and that of
Vigh's mother, who lives in Sunset,
5. Affiant went to Pam Tucker's residence located at
261 West 1425 North, Sunset and conducted a search of that
residence.

During the search, affiant located three to four

pounds of marijuana underneath the home in a crawl space.
Affiant also located a large amount of money totalling
approximately $12,000.
6.

Affiant spoke with Detective Dave Nance who stated

that he went to the Clearfield Trailer Park and observed it to be
located at 442 South State.

He stated he looked at #66 and

observed it to be a single wide mobile home, beige in color with
brown trim.

Affiant spoke with personnel at Clearfield Police

Department who stated that the manager of Clearfield Trailer Park
indicated that Dennis Vigh lived at that address.
7.

Affiant contacted Bountiful dispatch and was

informed that Vigh has a 1989 Ford with license 217 EVE, vin
#1FAPP31X7KK103453 registered to him.
8.

Affiant obtained a criminal history on Vigh which

showed that Vigh was convicted on June 2, 1986 of Arranging for
the Sale of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony and
Attempted Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a third degree
felony.

Affiant observed a search warrant in that case, a copy

of which is attached and made a part of this affidavit. Affiant
also noted that Vigh was charged with Possession of Cocaine in
March, 1990.

The records of the Davis County Attorneys Office

shows that this matter was disposed of by diversion.

The

criminal record also showed that Vigh was charged with possession
of controlled substances in 1980 and 1983.
9, Affiant believes that based upon affiant's
independent investigation, the information supplied by the
informant is accurate. Affiant further believes that the
information is reliable based upon the fact that the informant
has come forward as a citizen and is not receiving any
remuneration for the information provided,
10.

Affiant has been involved in the investigation of

controlled substance violations for over one year and during that
time has been involved in numerous searches of residences
involving individuals who sell controlled substances.

In each of

those instances, drug paraphernalia has been located.

Affiant is

also aware from experience and courses attended on the
investigation of such offenses, that individuals who sell
controlled substances often maintain records of such sales in
their residences.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a Search Warrant be
issued for the search of the above-described premises and vehicle
and the seizure of the items being searched for.

Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
June, 1992.

Circuit Court Judge

day of

LOREN D. MARTIN
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
In Re: Search of the
^
premises described as
450 South 54 6 East, Apt. C,
Clearfield, Utah,

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

SEARCH WARRANT

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by
Kent Lewis, Davis County Metro Narcotic Strike Force, that he has
reason to believe that in the below-described premises there are
items which constitute evidence of the commission of a crime.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED in the daytime, to make
immediate search of the premises described as:
450 South 546 East, Apt. C,
Clearfield, Utah,
and search for the following property:

Marijuana,
Paraphernalia associated with the use or
packaging of marijuana,
Mushrooms,
Chemical p s i l o c y n .

And if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it
forthwith before me at the Circuit Court, County of Davis, or
retain such property in your custody subject to the order of this
Court.
,

Given under my hand and dated this j ^

t-—

day of December,

1985.

Circuit Court Judge

LOREN D. MARTIN
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
AFFIDAVIT FOR

In Re: Search of the
premises described as
450 South 546 East, Apt.C,
Clearfield, Utah.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

:

SEARCH WARRANT

:

Before K. Roger Bean, Circuit Court Judge, an officer
having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person
charged with a public offense, the undersigned, being first duly
sworn, deposes and says that he has probable cause to believe
that on the premises which are described as:
450 South 546 East Apt C
Clearfield, Utah,
there is now certain property described as:
Marijuana,
Paraphernalia associated with the use or
packaging of marijuana,
Mushrooms,
Chemical psilocyn.

The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are
as follows:
1. On September 19, 1985, Agent Paul Rapp of the Davis
County Metro Narcotics Strike Force purchased marijuana from
Dennis Vigh.
2. On September 24, 1985, Agent Rapp purchased psilocyn
mushrooms from Dennis Vigh.
3. A confidential informant told Brian Wallace, Clinton
Police Department, that Dennis Vigh was selling marijuana from
his residence at 450 South 546 East, Apt C. , Clinton, Utah.
4. A different confidential informant told Steve Hill,
Clearfield Police Department, that he or she, the informant, was
a resident of Townhouse Apartments which is the complex of the
above listed apartment, and that he had seen many persons coming
and going from the apartment at all hours of the night and day
and that the informant had witnessed exchanges at the door. Such
a pattern of traffic is typical of that where drugs are being
sold.
5.

A third confidential informant told Detective William

Holthaus of Clearfield Police Department that he had been in the
above-described apartment and had seen a dresser drawer filled
with marijuana on October 21, 1985.
6.

A fourth confidential informant advised Agent Rapp

and Agent Allen Larsen of the State Narcotics and Liquor Law
Enforcement Bureau, that Dennis Vigh sells marijuana from the
above-described location and this informant introduced Agent Rapp
to Vigh for the purpose of making the buys mentioned in

paragraphs 1 and 2 herein.

The information from this informant

is therefore considered reliable.
7.

Your affiant is supervisory agent of the Davis County

Metro Narcotics Strike Force and in that capacity received the
information outlined herein from the agents and officers named.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued
for the search of the above-described premises and the seizure of
any of the said items.

K^JI^^
Affiant
-tj'—

Subscribed and sworn to me this /?-

day of December, 1985,

Circuit Court Judge

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
)
)

ss

RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT

I hereby certify, and return, that by virtue of the within
Search Warrant to me directed, I have searched for the goods and
chattels therein named, at the place therein described: (Strike
either (1) or (2), whichever is inapplicable)
(1) and that I have such goods and chattels before the Court,
described as follows:

and that I have been unable to find such goods and chattels.

I, \W//<V
A?- LY/#&£KS',
the officer by whom this Warrant was executed, do swear that the above inventory contains a true
and detailed account of all the property taken by me on the Warrant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
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Judge

!£*** day of
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MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
In Re: Search of the mobile home
located at 442 South State, #66,
Clearfield, a single wide trailer
beige in color with dark brown
trim, occupied by Dennis Richard
Vigh and the vehicle described
as a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
#217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453,
registered to Dennis Vigh.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss.

SEARCH WARRANT

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS:
Proof by Affidavit having this day been made before me
by Gary Haws, Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force, that there is
probable cause to believe that in the below-described premises
and vehicle there is property or evidence which:
(1) Was unlawfully acquired and is unlawfully
possessed.
(2)

Is evidence of the crime of possession of

controlled substances.
YOU ARE THEREFORE AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED to search the
premises and vehicle described as:
The mobile home located at 442 South State, #66,

Clearfield, Utah, a single wide trailer beige in
color with dark brown trim, occupied by Dennis
Richard Vigh; and a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
number 217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453, registered
to Dennis Richard Vigh.
and search for the following property or evidence:
Controlled substances including marijuana and cocaine
Items of drug paraphernalia
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled substances
Documents evidencing the ownership and occupancy of the
residence
Money
If the same or any part thereof is discovered and seized, it may
be brought before the magistrate or retained in police custody
subject to further court order.
This Warrant shall be served in the daytime, and must
be served within ten days from the date of issuance.
Given under my hand and dated this
1992.

Circuit Court Judge

day of June,

58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture,
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as a sales representative
of a manufacturer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules II through V except that he
may possess such controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second degree felony and upon
a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree
felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty
of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a
second or subsequent conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance,
unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while
acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement,
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied
by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those
locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where controlled substances
are being used or possessed in violation of this chapter and the use or possession is open,
obvious, apparent, and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the substance himself
or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of
controlled substances by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription
or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and intentionally to prescribe,
administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent
required in Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis of the
juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile means a
"child" as defined in Section 78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring

the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and intentionally to prescribe
or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities
necessary to treat the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to
another person knowing that the other person is using a false name, address, or other personal
information for the purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the amount is more than 16
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of
the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any
public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by
a person previously convicted under Subsection (2)(b), that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of
marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a
controlled substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in
violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance to
another licensee or other authorized person not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this chapter or by a rule
issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notification, order form,
statement, invoice, or information required under this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty
of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal
proceedings under this chapter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by
information or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or intentionally,
that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony.

(4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the
purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be,
a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized
person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration
of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting
to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance
by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance
from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written
order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance,
or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the
terms of this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any application, report, or other
document required to be kept by this chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any
prescription, order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed
to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint,
or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E - Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a,
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if the
act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those
schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary institution or on the grounds
of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which
are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or
institution under Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse,
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections
(5)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act occurs.

(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been
established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole until the
minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less
than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under this subsection is
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the actor mistakenly
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware
of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the
act occurred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the location where
the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful under this chapter
is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for that
offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of,
any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state,
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to
prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person convicted under
this chapter that the person has previously been convicted of an offense under the laws of this
state, the United States, or another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense
within this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the defendant or that
probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or protection of society, the court,
notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a
minimum term to be served by the defendant, of up to 1/2 the maximum sentence imposed by
law for the offense committed.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as provided in Subsection
(9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon
the complaint, in misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to the
substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged past conviction of the defendant
and specifically stating the date and place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant
was convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time of his arraignment,
or afterwards by leave of court, but in no event later than two days prior to the trial of the
offense charged or the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or a later
date when granted by the court, the court shall read the allegation of the previous conviction to
the defendant, provide him or his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation of the past conviction of
the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, except where the admissibility in evidence of a
previous conviction is otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged
and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the defendant of its decision to impose a minimum
sentence under Subsection (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or denies the

previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous conviction, the court shall afford him
an opportunity to present evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous
or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was pardoned. The evidence shall be
made a matter of record. Following the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether
the defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for a showing of abuse
of discretion. Following the findings by the court, the defendant shall be sentenced under
Subsection (9)(a) or under the appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion
determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates that probation is
subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b).
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections 76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled
substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with
knowledge of the character of the substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or
orderly under his direction and supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures,
distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational
new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research;
or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his
employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.

